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On the Nature of Man

Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636

I. It is here shewed wherein providence consisteth; Plato’s opinion concerning the same,…

Sect. 1

Since we have shewed that there is a Providence, and also what it is; we will now declare, in what things, that providence beareth sway; whether in things universall, or things particular, or in both.

Plato affirmes that it hath government both of universall, and particular things; and he divideth his discourse of providence into three parts. The first he calls the providence of the first and supreamest GOD, and that this providence is especially over the IDEAE (that is, the most beautifull formes of things:) and in the next place, over the whole world in general, as, over the heavens, the stars, and all generall things; even over the predicaments of substance, quantity, and quality, with such like: yea, and over all things which are especially contained under those predicaments.

His opinion likewise is, that the providence of a second degree of gods, which (as he conceiveth) turne about the Sphaeres; hath rule over the ingendring of all the baser living-creatures, & of plants, and of all things which are subject unto generation, and corruption. Yea, and Aristotle himselfe ascribes the ingendring of such things, to the Sun, and unto the Zodiack circle.

That which according to Plato’s opinion, is the third providence, hath predominācie over the events and ends of those things which are begun or perfected by us; as also over the course and condition of mans life; and over all those naturall and materiall things; and over such as are called instrument all things, whether they bee good or evill. And the principall agents in this providence, he supposed to bee certaine Angells (or spirits) ordained to bee alwayes conversant upon the earth, and to have the charge over those things which men doe.

But hee affirmes that the second and the third providence also, have their whole essence from the first; so that all things are in effect, governed by the power of the chiefest God, who ordained the first, the second, and the third, to be employed in the well-ordering, and governing of things.

Now this is praise worthy in Plato, that he referreth all unto GOD, and affirmes all providence to depend upon his will. But whereas he sayes there is a second providence, committed unto those which turne the heavens about (as he hath said) we commend him not in so affirming. For (if any such were) that which they performed, is not a worke of providence; but rather, a worke of necessity, whereunto they were destinated. For, let them be figured how they will, it must necessarily follow, that things must both be done as they were done; and that they might not be in any other maner then they are. And I have already shewed, that nothing done by providence, is subject unto necessity.

IINow the Stoick Philosophers (who defend as an undeniable truth, that there is a destiny, necessitating all things, and that some things are also in our power) doe leave no place at all for providence; and indeed they overthrow (as is before declared) by affirming there is destiny, so much of their owne opinion, as averrs that things are in our power.

Democritus, Heraclitus, and Epicurus, are of opinion that there is no providence either of universall, or of particular things. And Epicurus hath expressed his meaning to this purpose.

The nature (saith hee) which is blessed and incorruptible; neither is of it selfe troubled with any businesse; neither occasioneth any other to be troublesomely imployed: and therefore, neither is angry for any thing; nor favoureth any thing; because all such like things, doe betoken weaknesse. Yea the gods cannot bee angry, in regard anger never chanceth unto any, but when something succeedeth contrary unto their will, which thing cannot at any time happen unto the gods.

The opinion of these men is conformable to the principles which are devised by themselves. For, it is no wonder if they hold opinion that there is no providence to governe any thing, who affirme that the world was made by hap-hazzard. For how should those things which had no Creator, have any providence to preserve or governe them? Seeing it is plaine that such things must be confusedly caried to & fro, by hap-hazzard, which were made by chance, and at adventure, in the beginning.

Wee must therefore withstand them in their first opinion, as wee have done already (and so disprove the same) that it may be well manifested there is a providence. And for that cause wee will refer the confutation of these men, unto a fitter opportunity; and proceed to examine the opinion of Aristotle; and others, who say that particular things are not governed by any providence.

For Aristotle in the IIIsixth booke of his Ethicks to Nichomachus, hath covertly delivered that particular things are governed by nature onely. For, nature being (saith he) divine, and ingraffed in all things which are ingendred, doth naturally administer a way unto each, to chuse which is most expedient for it, and to avoid such things as are hurtfull thereunto. And (indeed) every living-creature (as we have shewed heretofore) maketh choice of such nourishment, as is agreeable unto it; earnestly pursuing what is convenient for it; and naturally knowing what cures are pertinent unto the diseases thereof.

Euripides, and Menander, have in some places affirmed, that the principall parts of the minde, which is in every man, doth by providence governe each man, and no GOD at all. But the minde is conversant in those things onely which are in our power; and they are either in actions which may be done, or in the arts, or in contemplation: Whereas providence is busied in things which are not in our power; as to be rich, or to be poore; to be in health, or to be sick; wherewith neither the minde, nor nature, (as Aristotle himselfe holdeth opinion) have any thing to doe, in that sense.

For the workes of nature are evident: and if a murtherer bee sometime punished, and sometime let goe without punishment, here is that pertinent either to the minde, or unto nature (as it is unto providence?) except some will affirme that things belonging to nature, and unto the minde, are pertinent unto providence; and that things which follow upon the choice of the minde, and operations of nature, doe afterward belong unto destiny; which being granted, all that should bee in our power, would be quite overthrowne.

But the matter is not at that point. For (as hath beene already declared) every thing belonging unto the minde (whether it be for practise or contemplation) is all in our power. Neither doe all things which are contained under providence, belong to nature; though every thing belonging to nature, is governed by providence. For many things wrought by providence, are not the workes of nature; as I have declared in discovering the murtherer; neither is nature in all points, the same with providence, though it be (as indeed it is) a part of providence. And therefore these men doe ascribe the providence over particular things both to nature, and unto the minde.

Sect. 2

I. Of their absurd opinion, who affirme that GOD hath care of universall, but not of particular things. II. The error of the vulgar, concerning blessednesse; and of their causelesse, and impious reprehension of GODS Providence. III. Of the blasphemies which must consequently follow the deniall of GODS Providence, over particular things.

There be some who affirme, that God so provides for the continuance of all things which hee hath created, that nothing shall faile which hee hath made; and that his providence extends to this thing alone, without regarding particulars, which are left by him to succeed as meer casualty shall bring them about.

Hereupon (as they conceive) it commeth to passe, that so many injuries, so many murthers, and (in briefe) that so much wickednesse, and oppression is increased among men: yea, thereupon it commeth (say they) to passe, that some of them are punished, some unpunished, and that little or nothing is performed, either according to right reason, or the Canons of Law.

For, how (as they think) can it be possible that God hath care of any thing, when as neither law, nor true judgement beareth sway? but where the contrary hath rather the chief rule? and where the best men are for the most part wronged, oppressed, and plunged into innumerable afflictions; while Tyrants and wicked men are advanced to offices, to powerfull dignities, to riches, and to all such things as are well esteemed of in this life?

But they who speake in this maner, are not onely ignorant of many other things, that are expressed in our discourse of providence; but estranged also to the immortality of the soule: For, supposing the soule to bee mortall they shut up all things belonging unto man within the compasse of this life; and (judging perversly of those things which are good) they imagine that such as abound in riches, and beare great sway by the places of authority, and vaunt of other such like temporall (or materiall) commodities, are the only blessed and happy men.

But of the vertues of the minde (which exceed by many degrees all bodily and externall things) they make no account at all. Howsoever those commodities are the best, which belong unto the best things. And in that respect, vertue as far surpasseth riches and health, and such like, as the soule is more excellent then the body: And therefore also, vertue aswell alone, as together with other things, makes a man to be blessed.

Vertue with other things is considered according to a finite amplitude, as a thing of two ells, or the like; but alone, and by it selfe, it is considerable according to an indefinite circumscription, as a heape. For if from a heape (which is a thing having an indefinite circumscription) you may take away two bushels (which is a finite quantity) two bushels is indeed taken from the heape: yet that which is left continueth still to be an heape.

In like maner, if from vertue (considered in its own indefinite amplitude) you take away all the good things that are bodily or externall (which are but finite things) and leave the vertue onely, (which is an indefinite good) the blessednesse remaineth still intire; because vertue, even of it selfe, is perfectly sufficient to blessednesse. And therefore every good man is blessed (though no externall good be left him) and every wicked man is miserable, though he hath all those things hapned together, which are called the goods of Fortune.

The multitude not knowing IIthus much, doe think that they onely are blessed, who have all things at will, for their bodily delight, and abound in riches; and they can oft finde fault with providence which governeth our affaires, not with respect unto those things onely which are apparent unto us, but with regard unto those also, which are according to the fore-knowledge of GOD.

For GOD foreseeing, that it would be expedient for him to bee poore, who is now honest and good, (and that riches comming fast upō him, would corrupt his minde) doth keep him in that poverty, which is most convenient for the chiefe good of that man. And in regard God foresaw also, that the rich, man would be grievous to others in the want of riches (by committing robberies, murthers, and other great outrages) hee suffered him to enjoy riches.

Poverty hath been many times profitable also, in making us to beare the losse of our children with more contentednesse; and in preventing the vexations which might happen by wicked servants; and perhaps their lives would have beene more bitter to us then their deaths, if our children had lived to bee wicked; or if wee should have had false and thee-vish servants. We foreseeing nothing that is to come; but beholding only the things present, cannot judge rightly of that which may fall out; but unto GOD all future things are as evident as those which are present.

Thus much wee have spoken against those who have presumed to blame GODS providence; and against whom this part of Scripture may well be applyed, Shall the clay say to the potter, why hast thou made me thus? For it is an arrogance to be abhorred, that he who dares not finde fault with an earthly Law-giver, should prescribe lawes to GOD, and object against the workes of his providence.

But we will forbeare to meddle further with such extravagancies, (or to speake more properly, with such impieties) and proceed in disproving them, who say, that particular things are not governed by any providence, and yet allow that universall, and generall things, are governed by a providence. For no man can alleadge more then these three causes, to prove that there is no providence of God over particular things.

Either it must bee because GOD knoweth not that it is good to take care for such things; or because he will not; or because he cannot. But nothing is more estranged from that blessed Essence, then ignorance, and unskilfulnesse: For It is knowledge, and science, and wisdome it selfe. Nay, there is none among men, so ignorant (if he be in his wits) but knowes, that if all particular things should be destroyed, the generall things could not possibly consist; seeing universall things, are made up of particulars. Yea, all the particular things, and the generall things are equall, and converted, & destroyed, and preserved together. If therfore particular things perish, the universall will also perish. And there is no reason why wee should imagine that all singular things could escape destruction, if no care were taken of them from above.

Now whereas to avoid this objection, they grant that GODS providence extendeth to this onely; that individualls shall bee providently preserved, so far forth as may conduce to the preservation of generall things; they have said enough (though they bee not aware thereof) to prove that there is, also, some providence over individualls. For (as they themselves have said in effect) GOD by preserving the species, preserveth also the kindes.

Sect. 3

I. Of the unreasonablenesse of their opinion, who thinke that God despiseth to take care of particular things. II. Of Gods undeniable ablenesse to governe individualls; and of the capablenesse which particulars have of the divine providence. III. Mans readinesse to call upon God in suddain extremities (as it were by naturall instinct) is an argument of providence.

Some there be who (although they confesse that GOD is not ignorant how to provide for particular things) doe affirme, that he will not assume the care of them. Now every one that will not doe a thing; either will not doe it, because of sloth, or else for that it is not comely for him so to doe.

No man will be so mad as to impute sloth to GOD; For sloth is bred of these two; pleasure, and feare; and every one that is slothfull, is thereby drawn away by the love of some ease (or pleasure) or else discouraged by feare: and to cōceive either of these to be in GOD, were an impious absurdity.

If they that will not be so prophane to lay slothfulnesse to GODS charge, shall say it is undecent for GOD, and unworthy the majesty of so high a blessednesse, to descend so low and unto such vile & smal things (or to be as it were prophaned by the absurdities, and obscenities of those materiall things which depend upon the will of man; and that therefore he will not take upon himselfe the government of such matters) they (not heeding it) impute unto GOD, in so saying, two very faulty things, pride, and impurity.

For either the Creator despiseth to take on himselfe the government and administration of individualls through haughtiness: (which is most absurd to affirme) or else through feare of being defiled, as they speake. And that is no lesse absurd then the other. For if they know the nature of the Sunne-beams to be such, that they can exhale naturally all moisture, even from dung-hills when they shine upon them, and that neither the Sunne, nor his beames are any whit contaminated, or defiled thereby, but keepe neverthelesse their owne purity: how can they conceive that GOD should be polluted, by those things which are below? Surely these cannot be the conjectures of men, that have any knowledge of what is pertinent unto the nature of GOD.

For the God-head is untouchable, uncorruptible, not possibly to be contaminated, and above all alteration: But pollution and such like things are the workes of change, and betoken alteration.

IIAnd how can it bee counted other then most absurd, that an artificer (of what art soever) and especially a Physitian, taking care of generall things, should heedlesly passe over things particular? without caring to shew his art in them (though things of the least consequence) seeing hee cannot chuse but know that every part standeth in some stead unto the whole? much more absurd were it for any man to be of opinion; that God who is the Creator of all, should be more unskilfull then an artificer; and what else can be alleaged, if he be willing, but that hee cannot take the care of particulars? And what can be affirmed more manifestly repugnant to the nature of GOD, then to say he is weak, and lacketh ability to doe well?

For two other causes, GODS providence is by some judged not to be exercised in particular things. The one is, because the nature of God (as they thinke) serveth not thereunto; the other is, for that they conceive particular things to be incapable of his providence.

But that it is agreeable to the nature of GOD to governe by his providence, they themselves (who have denied it) doe implicitly confesse, when they affirme that his providence ruleth universall things; especially seeing the inferiour things are not able to mount up, unto such as are much above them; whereas the power of those which are superiour, descendeth even unto the lowest, (even to things insensible) for their preservation: yea, all things depend upon the will of GOD, and draw from thence, their continuance, and well-being.

And that the nature of individualls (though infinitely multiplyed) is capable of being governed by Providence; it is plaine by those living creatures which are ordered by Rule and Authority. For, some of them, as Bees and Ants, and divers others, which being assembled together, are continued under certaine Captaines (or guides) whom they obediently follow: But this is best perceived if we looke into the government of common-wealths and the conversation that is amongst men: For it is plaine, that it admits the administration and care, both of Lawgivers, and also of subordinate magistrates; and how can that which is capable of such things, be unfit, to receive an orderly government from the providence of the Creator?

IIIThis also is no small argument, that there is providence over particular things, even that the knowledge thereof is naturally ingraffed in men: which is evident, when wee are brought to any great extremity; for wee then slie immediately unto GOD by prayer, as if without teaching, it were naturally written in our hearts, that help were to be sought of GOD.

Nature except it have beene taught, cannot of it selfe lead us unto that, the doing whereof is not according to nature: neither doth it move us to fly thither for assistance, where none is to be had: yet when any great affliction, or feare suddenly oppresseth us; we cry out unto GOD before we be aware; and before we have had time to bethinke our selves what wee have to doe. Now, every naturall consequence, is a forcible evidence admitting no contradiction.

Sect. 4

I. Of the occasion and grounds of their error, who thought there was no Providence ruling individualls. II. How men ought to behave themselves in the search of Gods providence, which is beyond their comprehension. III. Of Divine permission, and the manifold species thereof.

The occasions & ground of their error who say there is no providence over particular things, are these. First, they conceived the soule to bee mortall, and that it perished with the body. And secondly, because these men could not comprehend by their understanding and reason, how there should bee any providence ruling individualls.

But that the soule is not mortall, and that all things pertaining unto man, are not shut up within the compasse of this life, it appeareth (even to heathen men) both by the opinions of the wisest among the Grecians, who taught the transmigration of soules from body to body; as also by the places which they affirmed to bee allotted out, unto the Soules departed, according to their good or evill course in this life; and by those punishments wherwith soules are (as they hold) punished by themselves, for the offences they have committed.

For these things, although they be erroneous in other circumstances and respects; yet in this they are true, and their authors do all agree therein, that the soule remaineth after this life, and shall come to Iudgement.

IIBut if wee cannot attaine unto the reason of that governance which providence hath over particular things; which indeed we cannot, as is implyed by this text: How unsearchable are thy judgements, and thy wayes past finding out! Let us not therupon conclude, there is no such providence: For no man ought to affirme there is neither sea, not sand, because he is ignorant of the limits of the Sea, and of the number of the sands: seeing by the same rule, they might aswell say that there is neither man, nor any other living-creature, because they know not the number either of the men, or of the living-creatures.

Particular things are to us infinite: Things which are unto us infinite, and also unknowne unto us; and therefore, though universalls may be (oftentimes) comprehended by our understanding, yet individualls are not possibly comprehensible thereby.

There is in every man a double difference; one in respect of other men; and another in respect of himselfe: yea, there is in every man great differences, and alterations even in respect of himselfe. Every day; as, in the maner of his life; in his actions, (or affaires) in his necessities, in his desires; and in all things which doe happen, or pertaine unto him.

It is not much otherwise with an irrationall-creature; for according to the manifold necessities, and occasions thereof, it is very speedily caried hither and thither; and soon altered againe as other opportunities require.

These things considered, that Providence which is able to keep a continuall course with every one of those infinite and incomprehensible particulars (which are so differing also, so changeable, and of so many fashions) must needs be such a Providence as is agreeable to all, and every one of those individualls: and extended more infinitely then those things are, whereunto it should reach.

And if this Providence must be so fit, and so infinite in regard of the infinite difference of individualls: no doubt but the reason and method of this Providence is as infinite; and if it be infinite, it cannot possibly bee comprehended by us. And it becomes not us to deny that gracious providence which governes all things, because our ignorance is unable to comprehend it. For those things which wee suppose to be amisse, are knowne well enough unto the wisdome of the Creator, to be well ordered.

Because wee are ignorant of their occasions, we causelesly judge many things to be imprudently done; and that which chanceth unto us in other things, by reason of our ignorance, falleth out also in the workes of providence; for we doe after the same sort cōceive of those things which belong to providence; receiving by obscure likelihoods, and by conjectures, certaine formes or shadowes of the workes thereof, by such things as we have seene.

Wee say therefore, that IIIsome things are done by Gods permission; and this permission is of many sorts: For he sometime permits that even the just man shall fall into misery, to declare unto others, that vertue which is concealed as in Iob.

Hee doth also permit some absurd things; that by the act which appeareth to bee absurd, some great and wonderfull matter may bee brought to passe, as the salvation of men by the Crosse.

Hee permits likewise the blessed Saints to be afflicted for another end; as that they might not fall from a sincere conscience, and that the loftinesse of the minde might be abated; as when St. Paul was buffetted by Satan.

Sometimes also, one man is rejected, and left as desolate for a time; that others considering his case, might be instructed, and amended thereby. As in the example of Lazarus and the rich man; for, when we see any man afflicted, our hearts are naturally touched therewith, according as Menander hath very well expressed: By seeing others feele the Rod, We tremble with a fear of GOD.

Otherwhile, again, one man is afflicted for the glory of another; and neither for his owne sin, nor the sinne of his Parents: as, he that was blind from his birth, for the glorifying of the Son of man.

It is permitted also that some should be persecuted, to be a pattern of constancy unto others; and that when their glory is exalted, others might be incouraged to suffer in the like case, in hope of the glory to come; and for the blessednesse which is expected after this life; as in the Martyrs, and in those who have yeelded up their lives for their Country, for their kinred, or for their masters.

Sect. 5

I. One may otherwhile be afflicted for the good of another, without infringing the Justice of divine Providence. Why holy men suffer bitter deaths and persecutions. II. Death, or sufferings are no disadvātages to good men; neither are the unlawfull actions of the wicked, justifiable, though Providence convert thē to good ends.

Now, if any one thinke it against reason, that one man should be afflicted for the amendment of another; let him know that this life, is (not the perfection of mans happinesse) but a place of wrestlings, and of striving for mastery, in respect of Vertue: And the greater the labours and sufferings are, the more glorious Crown of Glory shall be obtained: because the recompence of Rewards, is according to the measure of Patience.

Saint Paul was contented to undergoe the manifold afflictions and tribulations which he suffered, that he might obtain the greater, and more perfect Crown of a Conquerour: (which he himself confesseth to be more then all our sufferings can merit) and therefore the works of Providence are justly and very decently performed.

A man may the better allow this to be so, (and conceive that GOD governs all things, so well and so fitly, that the nature of each thing cannot more desire) if he doe but propose unto himself the beleeving of these two things which are generally confessed among men: namely, that GOD, onely, is good and wise: For, in that he is Good, it is agreeable unto his goodnesse to employ his providence over all things; and in that he is wise, he hath a regard to performe them wisely and exactly: because, if he used not his Providence, he could not be good: and if he did not use it well, hee could not be wise.

He therefore, that gives his minde to consider discreetly of these matters, will not misesteem of any thing which is wrought by divine providence; neither speak evill thereof without due examination: but rather accept of all things, as exceeding well performed: and marvaile at their admirable decency and perfection, though the ignorant multitude judge according to a false appearance: For in conceiving otherwise, wee bring upon our heads (besides the guilt of blasphemy) great blame for our sottish presumption.

IINow, in that wee say, all things are done well, wee justifie not the naughtinesse of men, or of such evill works as are in our power to doe, or leave undone; but, we speak it of the works of Providence which are not in our power. For, if any man object and say, How falls it out that holy men are put cruelly to death without desert? why, if they were unjustly condemned, did not Gods just providence hinder those murthers? and if they deserved to be so put to death, why are not they without blame who caused them to bee slaine?

To this we answer, that the murtherers of such men were injurious in slaying them; and that they which were so slain, were slain either for their desert, or their profit Somtime deservingly, for evills committed by them in secret: and sometimes for their profit: Gods providence, thereby preventing either future sins, or worse mischiefes to come; and in those respects it was good for them that their life should be shortned. Thus was it with Socrates, and the Saints.

But, they who slew these men, did not slay them for any such cause; neither was it lawfully done; but out of the corruption of their owne minds, and for gain and robbery: For, the Act is in mans power; but what shall follow upon the Act, (as whether we shall be slain or no) is not as he will: neither is any death evill, except for sinne onely, as is manifest by the death of the Saints.

But, wicked men, although they die in their beds on a sudden, and without pain, doe neverthelesse die an evill death, which brings them unto an evill buriall: I meane, to bee buried in their sinne; yet whosoever killeth any man murtherously, doth wickedly in so doing.

If hee killeth any one for that which deserveth death; he is then to be accounted among hangmen and executioners. If it be for the gaining of some profit by them that are slaine, he is to be reputed among cruell and wicked murtherers.

The like may be said of them who murther their enemies, or oppresse them by extreame servitude, or use any manner of inhumane cruelty, against them whom they have overcome.

They also are as little to be justified, who seeke the inriching of themselves, by extorting other mens goods: for, though it may be expedient for those, from whom they were extorted, that they should be deprived of them; yet, they which wrested away more then their owne, were unjust, in so so doing. For, they take them out of a covetous desire of those good, and not for that it was expedient for them, whō they dispossessed of such things.