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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
I. of destiny, and of the absurdities, impieties, and blasphemies which follow their…
Our opinion is that they who ascribe all things which are done, to the motions and constellations of the Starres, doe not onely oppose the vulgar notions of humane reason; but teach also (in effect) that all governance in commonweales, are to no purpose. For indeed, lawes are in vaine, and judgements superfluous, because they punish innocent men, without cause.
If their opinion bee true, it is also a thing unreasonable to reprehend or praise any man: yea, if every thing come to passe by destiny (or by an inavoidable decree) our prayers are foolish, and ineffectuall bablings; and there is neither place nor use for providence or piety.
Moreover (if this were true) what account is to be made of man? or what is he more then an instrument serviceable to the motions of the superiour bodies? Seeing, as they affirme, he is moved by the celestiall influences not only to the performance of all bodily actions; but to every thought also which is in his minde.
They that are of this opinion doe generally take away (together with such things, as should bee left in our power) the nature likewise, of all contingent things; and in a manner subvert and destroy the whole world; making the Stars injurious homicides, and cuckold-makers, or at least the causers of all adulteries and murthers.
Nay God who is the Creator of the starres, is (by this blasphemous opinion) made to beare the blame of all which is ill done, rather then the starres; because hee made them such as should necessarily, and inavoidably, bring, and lay evills upon us.
Thus, their absurditie extends not onely to the subversion of commonweales; but maketh God also to bee the author of all sinne; and the cause of all mischiefes: Which absurdity & blasphemy is both impossible for them to and intollerable for us to heare.
IISome there be who affirme, that things may bee in our power, and that there may be destiny also. For, some things (say these) is given by destiny to every thing that is made, as to the water to coole; to every plant to beare such fruit as is according to its kinde; to a stone to sinke downeward; to fire to mount upwards; and to living-creatures to accept or to be desirous of things agreeable unto them. And when nothing (without us, or belonging to destiny) opposeth it selfe against that which we endeavour; then it becomes perfectly in our power to proceed; yea and then (say these) we shall assuredly effect it.
They who affirme this are Chrysippus, Philopater, and many other men of great sufficiency and esteem among the Stoicks, and all which they have said (what shew soever it makes of somewhat else) proves nothing but this; that all things are done by destiny.
For though they have IIIsaid that our attempts are given unto us by destiny; and that they are sometimes hindered by destiny, and sometime left at liberty; yet (the matter being well observed) it is plain that all things are done by destiny; even those things (for ought they have yet said) which they would pretend to be in our owne power. And wee will use against them no other arguments, to declare the absurdity of their opinion, then such as they themselves have made use of.
As long as the same causes continue, it is necessary (as they themselves have said) that the selfe-same events should alwayes fall out; and it is impossible that a thing should chance sometimes in one maner, and sometimes in another fashion, when that thing is decreed from eternity how it shall come to passe.
If this bee so, as they have said, it is inavoidably necessary, but that the endeavour of a living-creature, should in all respects and altogether fall out in that one maner, which is agreeable to the unchāgeable course of destiny; because the selfe-same causes (doe continue and) beare rule in it. And if our appetite and our endeavour, doth follow fatall necessity; where then is that thing which (they say) is in our power; seeing the thing that should bee in our power, must be free?
It is free; if (notwithstanding the continuance of the same causes) it bee still in our power, to endeavour, or not to endeavour. But if our very endeavouring of a thing, bee subject unto a fatall necessity; it is plaine, that even those things which belong to our desire and appetite doe fall out by destiny, although they bee done by us, according to our nature, our desire, and our judgement.
For if it were possible that the same thing should not come to passe which did come to passe (by the course of destiny) then that proposition of theirs would be false, which affirmes that, as long as the same causes doe continue about any thing, it is necessary that the selfe same effects should ensue.
The like shall happen also to unreasonable-creatures, and to things without life: For, if they say our appetite is in our power; because wee have it of nature, (and for not other respect) why should they not say aswell that fire hath burning in its own power (seeing fire burneth naturally) according as Philopater hath in some sort affirmed in his booke of destiny.
These arguments considered, wee may affirme, that those things which we doe (being compelled thereunto) by destiny, are not things in our owne power. For wee may as 〈…〉 〈…〉 truely say, that the harp, the flute, and all other creatures that are unreasonable, or void of life, have in themselves a power to doe some things that wee doe by the use of them; which were absurdly affirmed.