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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
I. Of their opinion, who say that all was fore-appointed by destiny; and yet that the…
From these, wee will proceed to examine the opinion of the Aegyptian wise men, who say that the destiny proceeding from the constellations hath true effects; and yet may be prevented by prayers made for the averting thereof.
For they teach that there be certaine meanes ordained whereby men may pacifie the Starres, and mitigate their force: and that there are other powers, superiours to them, which are able to change or governe them: and that prayers, and supplications unto the gods for pacification, were devised to that purpose.
We will shew you, that in saying thus, they place destiny among contingent things: Now contingent things are indefinite; and indefinite things are unknowne: therefore by these mens opinion, all divination is overthrowne: and that especially which is by casting nativities, whereof they make most account of all other, as of a thing forceably and infallibly true.
If they tells us that the events of the figures (which they set) are very manifest, and well known to those who are skilfull; and that God hath hindered the same, when the figure hath not effect according to his proper vertue; we will reply, that it is absurd to account praier, and the service of the gods only, to be in our power; and no other thing.
For we will make this IIquare, and aske them how it come to passe, that all other things (which are to bee done or accepted by men) should depend upon such or such a constellation, or affection of the starres; and that prayer onely should bee in our power? For it is not onely doubtfull whether this thing it selfe be so; but as doubtfull also, for what cause, and upon what necessity it should be.
If there bee an art, and an orderly way whereby men may attaine to those pacifications, which may hinder such things as are effected by destiny: It may be questioned, whether all men may attaine this method, or some few only. If all may aspire unto it, then there is a possibility, by that meanes to give their destiny an utter overthrow, as soone as all have learned that art, which prevents and hinders the effects thereof.
If some onely may attaine this meanes, and not others; we would willingly know what maner of man, and who he is, that shall determine of this thing. For if destiny it self bee the cause, that some serve GOD, and some do not so; even that will bee another proofe, that all things are done by destiny, whereas it appeared by their opinion before mentioned, that our praying, and honouring of the Gods, is in our power, not only no lesse then destiny; but much more also.
Now if it be not destiny but some other thing which is cause thereof, then that thing shall rather be destiny: For all the force of destiny consisteth in this, that we either may or may not obtaine that which we petition for in our prayers. If we may, then is destiny of no force; and if wee may not prevaile by prayer, then all is subject unto destiny: and it will so fall out, that in some, all things are done by destiny, and that in some other, destiny effecteth nothing at all (because prayer is prevalent for some and not for others.) And this is evident, that whosoever determines hereof, he is the chiefe destiny: and so it will be another way declared, that all things are done by destiny (mediately or immediately)
IIIMoreover, (if truth were in this opinion) hee which doth distribute things shall be unjust, whether it bee destiny or some other divine power: Seeing the way of serving the gods is not equally and worthily distributed. For why should one be judged worthier then another? Seeing all are the instruments of destiny; and seeing no man doth any thing by a foreintended purpose of his owne: or, rather, seeing there is no man which hath any thing left unto his owne choice (according to their doctrine.)
For in things which are so done, none is either just or unjust; and therefore neither worthy, nor unworthy of favour: and whosoever maketh his division unequally (in things of such nature as these) to them, whose case is alone, he (even whosoever he bee) is unjust.