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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
I. Of Plato’s opinion concerning destiny; and how he agrees or dissents from the truth.
Examine we will in this Chapter, the opinion of Plato concerning destiny; for he speakes of a twofold destiny; one in substance, and another in operation.
He calleth destiny in substance, a certaine life, or soule, belonging to the whole world together; and destiny in operation, a certaine divine law, by an inevitable decree, which hee calleth 〈…〉, a holy decree, that cannot be escaped; & he saith it was given by the first & highest God, unto the soul of the world, for the universall garnishing of all things; and for the governing of all things which are made.
That which he calleth destiny in operation, he termeth also Providence. For whatsoever is done by destiny, is done also by Providence; though (on the contrary) all things which are done by Providence, are not effected also by destiny.
For, this divine law (which hee saith is both Providence and destiny) comprehends all things in it selfe; some of purpose, and othersome not of set purpose. It comprehends the chiefe, or antecedent causes (which are as it were principles) even of purpose; as our condescending unto any thing; our judgement, and our appetite, of desire. But whatsoever followeth like things of necessity, is beside purpose; and that choice of things, to be done, which is in our power, is of purpose.
Now after those things be determined, which are in our power; upon the self-same things (as it were beside purpose) follow, saith he, the workes of destiny. As for example; It is in our power to set saile; and wee have purposed so to doe; but saith he, when it is determined that wee will put to sea, other things may follow thereupon, namely, the suffering of shipwrack; which was not purposed at all.
Therefore, hee calleth those things beside purpose, which follow, and are consequēt to those things (that is to say) to those beginnings, and actions which are purposed by us. So then the principall things, and such as are in our power, bee done of purpose: whereas the things that follow upon them, are beside our purpose; and not in our power; but such as necessarily follow.
For the affirmes not that things effected by destiny, are determined from eternity; but they happen afterward, when things which are in our power have gone before. And hereunto agree those cō mon sayings; That the fault is in the chuser, and God is blamelesse: that, there is none to over-master vertue; and, that there bee divinations. For all this intends nothing else, but to shew, that our choice, and some actions according to our choice, are in our power; and that their events, with such things as happen afterward upon thē, should necessarily pertain to destiny.
That this is not truely affirmed, appeares by what is formerly expressed. And yet when hee calleth destiny the Ordinance and will of GOD, making all things to bee subject unto Providence, he differs not much from the divine Scriptures, which teach that Providence alone, is the governesse of all things.
But he dissenteth farre from them, when he sayes that the events doe necessarily ensue upon those things which are in our power. For wee say that things wrought by Providence are effected, not as necessary, but as contingent: because, if they followed of necessity, then the greatest part of our prayers would be in vaine; and according to his opinion our prayers would bee availeable for nothing, but to procure prosperous beginnings to our actions, or to petition that wee may chuse what is best. For after we have preferred one thing before another, all our praying should be fruitlesse, because all things by his opinion ensue of necessity, which doe afterwards follow.
But wee affirme, that IIprayer is forcible even in respect of those events. And wee say, that it is in the choice of Providence, whether wee shall suffer shipwrack or no (when wee have purposed to set saile) and that nothing falleth out so necessarily, but that it may either be so, or not so, as GOD pleaseth. For, he is not concluded under any necessity; neither is it lawfull to say, that his Will is confined by fatall necessity; seeing he is the Creator of necessity it selfe.
It is hee who laid that necessity upon the starres, by which they are constrained to keep the same course. It is hee that set bounds unto the Sea, and who hath appointed a necessary limitation to universall and generall things; which if they will call destiny, because in all respects, and altogether it so falleth out of necessity; as that in successiō all things which are made should also be destroyed (and the like) wee will not much contend about the same; because we will not contest for the bare names.
But GOD himselfe is not onely without the compasse of all necessity; but he is also the Lord and maker thereof: For, in that he himselfe is the absolute power of all things; and a nature wherein all power is comprehended; hee doth nothing as one subjected either to the necessity of nature, or decree of Law. But all things are in his hand, to doe, or not to doe; even those things which were otherwise necessary.
And that this might plainely be declared, hee stayed once the courses of the Sun, and of the Moone, which are moved of necessity, and keep alwayes one constant motion: thereby shewing, that nothing done by necessity doth confine him; but that according to his power all things are contingent.
Yet he made such a day but once (as wee finde it in holy Scripture) that he might onely set forth his power, and not dissolve that strong law which was made by him at the first, that the motion of the Starres should bee necessary.
So likewise, he did preserve some from death, as Enoch, and Elias, who were naturally mortall, and liable to corruption; that by all these things we might perceive his power and his will to be irresistible.
But the Stoicks have IIItaught, that when the Planets have wheeled about unto the same point, both in longitude, and latitude, wherein every one of them stood at the Creation, they shall within a certain limitation of time cause all to be set on fire, and destroyed. And then (as they also affirme) the world beginning anew, shall be restored unto the state wherein it was before.
Yea, they say further, that forasmuch as the stars shall have againe the same course; every thing that was in the former circuit shall come to passe againe without any alteration. Socrates shall be as hee was againe, and Plato, and every particular man; having the same friends, and the same Citizens; and that the like things shall befall every one; yea, that every man shall take in hand the same worke which he formerly wrought; and that every City, Village, and field shall bee brought to the like state againe: And that the whole Vniverse shall be restored unto the former condition againe; not one time onely, but as often as the revolutions of the Planets do come about to the same point, which revolutions they thinke shall be infinite and without number.
They say also, that the gods are not subject to this corruption; and that when they have observed one whole revolution, they know by that circuit, all things that shall come to passe in every succeeding round. For, there shall be (as they dreame) no new thing; but every thing which was before, shall bee reacted after one and the same sort, without any alteration in the least thing.
And some have said, that from this restauration, the Christians tooke occasion to conceive the resurrection: but the were much mistaken; for the Christian verity doth assure us, that the Resurrection shall bee perfected but once, and not according to the revolutions of the Starres.