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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
I. Of those who affirme wee have power to chuse what is to be done; and that the event of…
Now they who affirme, that the choice of those things which are to bee done, is in our power, and that the event of the things chosen depends on destiny (which is the opinion even of the wisest of the Grecians) their judgement, is partly right, and in some part erroneous: For, whereas they place in our power the choice of things to be done, and yet allow not the events of the same things, to be altogether at our dispose, they doe very rightly: but in that they attribute them unto destiny, they doe not well and their error shall easily be discovered.
For first they impute imperfection unto destiny, in saying it hath some part, but not all power: And secondly, they erre in making it a sequell to our Iudgement, in saying, that the worke of destiny followes our choice. For, if that be so, then destiny seemeth not to move us; but rather to be moved by us: And then, Man is to bee preferred, as having a greater power then destiny; because he maketh it, by his choice.
IIIt is better therefore to say, that Providence is causer of the event of things; because it is wrought rather by providence then destiny; and seeing it is the property of Providence, to distribute unto every one, that which for every one is most expedient. By this meanes also, the event of the things which are chosen, doe fall out sometime in one maner, and sometime in another, according to that which is most expedient.
If destiny be (as the Stoicks define it) A certaine concatenatiō of causes which may not be avoided; or a fast knitting together of causes which may not bee altered, and brings to every thing (& conveyes to and fro) such effects onely, as are according to the motions, and necessity of destiny it selfe; and not such effects rather, as are most expedient: What will they say then, of such as are blockish, and so foolish that they cannot direct their owne choice? whether commeth it of destiny or no, that they are such?
If it proceed not of destiny; then fooles, and blockheads, are without the compasse of destiny; and if they have their blockishnesse by destiny, then doth it necessarily follow that our choice also is not in our power: for if the lack of choice be contained under destiny; then it must needs be, that the faculty of chusing, and the thing to be chosen, must be contained under destiny. And so they run backe againe to them who affirm, that all things are done by destiny.
The strife likewise,IIIwhich is betweene reason, and lust in the continent, and incontinent man, is to no purpose, if all things be subject unto destiny: For, if it bee determined by a fatall necessity, that such a thing must be done and that such a thing must not bee done, what use is there of that strife in us (which is aforementioned?)
But if it bee not onely fatally determined, that we shall doe such a thing; but so ordered also, that wee shall doe it thus, or thus; what else doe they affirme, who are of this opinion, from this, that even our choice is in the number of those things which are subject unto destiny? For, it is our will and our choice which opposeth our lust, getting the victory in the continent, and which is overcome in the incontinent. And so, that which they first proposed, as their opinion, is overthrowne; and by that meanes our choice shall in no case bee in our owne power.